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Abstract
Holmström (1982) showed that free-riding is inevitable in partnerships where inputs are
substitutes. Legros & Matthews (1993) and Vislie (1994) showed that when inputs are strict
complements (Leontief technology), free-riding can be avoided with a linear sharing rule. This
paper considers the robustness and some extensions of the positive result of LMV. First, I show
that LMV’s result is not robust to the introduction of participation constraints and limited
liability. However, I construct a novel rule that mitigates that problem. Second, I perturb the
(deterministic) model of LMV. It turns out that free-riding is avoidable with noise added to joint
output, while free-riding is inevitable when noise is added to individual productivity.
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21. Introduction
A long tradition in economics compares the performance of different ownership arrangements of
firms. While capitalist firms are defined through separating ownership and production by having
an outside owner, partnership firms split the value of production in full between the partners.
Building on Alchian & Demsetz (1972), the seminal paper by Holmström (1982) argues that
partnership firms may suffer from free-riding problems. Holmström (1982) shows that efficient
provision of effort is not consistent with Nash behavior in static partnership games where inputs
are substitutes and actions are non-contractible. Capitalist firms, on the other hand, can mitigate
the free-rider problems by a principal breaking the budget (i.e., keep some of the surplus for
herself) whenever she observes a low joint output.
Motivated by the many examples of partnerships in the real world, a considerable literature has
questioned the generality of Holmström’s result.3 The present paper considers a particular branch
of that literature; works that explore effort taking in Leontief partnerships; partnerships where
joint output is determined by the partner with the least effort.4 Legros & Matthews (1993, section
3.1) and Vislie (1994), hereafter abbreviated LMV, find that if production is determined in such a
                                                
3 There are two different modeling traditions in this literature. The first tradition, which the present paper belongs to,
follows Holmström (1982) in modeling action and output spaces as continuous. This tradition includes Rasmusen
(1987) dealing with the case of risk-averse partners, Legros & Matthews (1993), and Strausz (1999) which discusses
a setup where the partners make their actions sequentially. The second tradition, which uses discrete models, includes
Williams & Radner (1993) and Legros & Matsushima (1991). D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1998) surveys the
solution techniques available in the discrete case.
4 The Leontief partnership model can shed light on surprisingly many interesting phenomena. First, in partnership
projects where time is involved, the completion time of a project may be when the last agent in the partnership
finishes his subtask. For example, the last author that completes his part determines the completion time of a book
where several co-authors write a part each. Second, the Leontief model offers a continuous strategy space treatment
of the stag hunt example used by Rousseau (1775/ 1993) to discuss the origins of the social contract (in the stage hunt
example, hunting a stag is successful only if all hunters decide to do so). The stag hunt example later has become of
large interest to game theorists and philosophers (see e.g., Fudenberg & Tirole 1991). In addition, Leontief type of
models have been used within macroeconomics to study Keynesian demand failures (Cooper & John 1988), within
3manner, there exists a linear sharing rule, denoted β*, which implements the efficient provision
of effort, and hence eliminates free-riding. The intuition for this result is that, given that the other
agents stick to the efficient action, no agent can gain by providing more effort (since output does
not change), and can be made to support the full decrease in output since his deviation is
proportional to the change in output.
The present paper discusses the robustness of the implementation result of LMV in two different
directions: by introducing participation constraints (and limited liability) on one hand, and by
introducing noise in the production on the other hand.
Let me motivate why it is important to test for robustness along these two directions. First, the
partnership literature has largely ignored whether a partnership can be expected to agree ex-ante
on efficient sharing rules (when such rules exist). The interesting problem is that a partner with a
strong bargaining power may wish to settle on a non-efficient rule, if that gives herself a greater
return. Hence it is of importance to have sharing rules that make provision of effort incentive
compatible under any distribution of participation constraints, to thereby make it possible to
distribute a large share of surplus to agents with strong bargaining power.
Proposition 1 constructs a simple sharing rule that solves the participation problem. This sharing
rule, which is inspired by the Groves’ mechanism, has the attractive property of being able to
implement the efficient provision of effort under any conceivable distribution of participation
constraints.
                                                                                                                                                             
game theory to study the evolution of conventions (Crawford, 1993), and within experimental economics to study
4The second part of the paper considers two alternative perturbations of the deterministic model of
LMV; noise added to joint productivity, and noise added to individual productivity. It turns out,
surprisingly, that these two perturbations give opposite conclusions. While implementation is
possible with noise added to joint output, it is not possible with noise added to individual
productivity. The intuition for the results is that while noise added to joint productivity leaves the
non-differentiability of the partnership problem intact, noise added to individual productivity
makes the (expected) production function differentiable, and a similar intuition to in Holmström
(1982) applies.
The paper is structured as follows. Part 2 presents the basic, deterministic, model, and Part 3
discusses the role of participation constraints and limited liability in that model. Part 4 consider
perturbed versions of the deterministic model, and Part 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Joint output, x, equals f(min [b1e1, ... , bnen]); where bi is a productivity parameter and ei ∈[0, Ei]
is agent i’s choice of effort. The function f is differentiable, strictly increasing and concave with
f(0) = 0. Cost of effort equals vi(ei), where vi(..) is differentiable, strictly increasing and convex
with v’(0) = v(0) = 0. Following the usual assumption in the literature, the utility of an agent is
assumed to be additively separable in money and effort; Ui := si(x)  - vi(ei), where si(..) is agent i’s
share of joint output. Sharing rules that satisfy Σisi(x) = x, ∀x, and si(x) ≥ 0, ∀i,x are considered.
                                                                                                                                                             
behavior in coordination games (Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990, Van Huyck, Battalio & Cook 1997).
5While the first condition just means budget-balance, the defining feature of a partnership, the
latter is a ‘limited liability’ assumption; a partner cannot be forced to pay a net transfer to the
other partners. Apart from being empirically plausible (see e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy,
1988), limited liability eliminates simplistic solutions with some troublesome properties. In
particular, consider linear sharing rules of the form bix + ai. As can easily be checked, by an
appropriate choice of the vector a, one can rig a sharing rule of the form βi*x + ai [recall that β*
is LMV’s solution to the partnership problem], where aj > 0 for some agent j (and hence ak > 0
for some other agent k) to satisfy both participation constraints and balancedness. Such a scheme
violates limited liability (insert x = 0). Why not leave the limited liability assumption and accept
such a sharing rule as a solution to the participation problem? Since the transfer aj is independent
of production level and thus independent of exerted effort of agent j, aj can be interpreted as an up
front transfer from the other partners to agent j. But then the optimal strategy for agent j is to
receive aj and then exert no effort to rather cash the outside option.5 Realizing this time
inconsistency problem, the partners with a low participation constraint will not accept to pay a
transfer up front to agent j, and hence make efficient production impossible.
Define the efficient effort-vector, e*, as the vector maximizing social surplus:
e* := 
e
arg max [f(min [b1e1, ..., bnen]) - v ei ii ( ) ]  (1)
                                                
5 This follows immediately from the fact that the size of the outside option exceeds the equilibrium utility from
participating when aj = 0. The idea is that agents choosing ei = 0 have resources to capitalize the outside option (e.g.,
think of the outside option as another job). This argument assumes that the utilization of the outside option is non-
verifiable to courts. If it is verifiable, contracts may be written that punishes any agent that cashes the outside option,
6Observation 1 (Legros & Matthews 1993, Vislie 1994).
There exists a balanced linear sharing rule β* that makes e* incentive compatible, where
βi* ≡ v ef b e b
i i
i i i
′
′
( *)
( *)
, ∀i.
Lemma 1.
Given limited liability, β* is the unique incentive compatible linear sharing rule.
The proof of Observation 1 can be found in LMV, and Lemma 1 follows immediately.
3. Participation Constraints
For illustration, consider an example where participation problems makes implementation of
efficient provision of effort impossible with linear rules.6
Example 1.
Adam and Betty’s joint payoff is given by x = 2min(eA, eB), where vi(ei) = 
1
2
2ei . Consequently,
we get, eA* = eB* = 1, βi* = 2
1 , and Ui(e*,β*) = 2
1 . When participation constraints are uniformly
zero, e* is clearly a Nash equilibrium under β*, since both incentive compatibility and individual
rationality is satisfied. Suppose, however, that Betty has an outside option of ¾  (any number
                                                                                                                                                             
and hence makes the implementation with a linear rule possible. However, other arguments supporting limited
liability, like wealth-constraints, as in Dow & Gorton (1997), may then apply.
6 It is assumed throughout that the formation of the partnership is efficient, i.e., that social surplus generated under e*
exceeds the sum of the outside options.
7between ½ and 1 will work), while Adam’s outside option is zero. In that case, Betty will not
participate in the partnership under β*, since it gives her less than doing her own project, in spite
of partnership formation being efficient. I now construct a novel sharing rule that mitigates the
participation problem.
Let gi : ℜ→Ei for any x, compute agent i’s effort assuming that she did not waste effort.7
Furthermore, let the quasi-surplus, labeled Q, be determined by the function,
Q(x) := [x -i ii xgv ))(( ]. (2)
For any x, the function Q(..) calculates the maximum social surplus for that output. For
illustration, consider n = 2 with b1 = b2 = 1. On the efficiency locus, where e1 = e2, quasi-surplus
equals social surplus, since no agent wastes effort. Off the efficiency locus, however, say e = (1,
2), agent 2 wastes effort, and the quasi-surplus exceeds the social surplus. It follows that quasi-
surplus is at least as high as the social surplus. Since social surplus increases along the efficiency
locus, social surplus as well quasi-surplus is maximized at e*. Now define the sharing rule σ* as,
σi*(x) := vi(gi(x)) + kiQ(x), with ki > 0 and kii
n
=

1
 = 1. (3)
For a given joint output, the first part of σ* compensates agent i for her cost of effort, assuming
that she did not waste effort. The second term of σ* gives agent i a constant fraction ki of quasi-
8surplus. I now show that, like the Groves mechanism, σ* makes the partners fully internalize the
social costs and benefits of their effort choice. However, unlike the Groves mechanism, σ* is
balanced both in and out of equilibrium, and also puts no strains on the liability of the agents.
Proposition 1.
The sharing rule σ*(x) is balanced, satisfies limited liability, and makes e* satisfy both incentive
compatibility and individual rationality.
Proof.
Clearly σ*(x) is budget-balanced since,
σ i xi
n *( ) 
=

1
=  
=
n
i
xgv ii
1
 ))(( + 
i
n
=

1
kiQ(x) = v g xi ii
n
( ( )) 
=

1
+ 
i
n
=

1
ki[x - v g xi ii
n
( ( ))] 
=

1
=
v g xi ii
n
( ( )) 
=

1
+ x - v g xi ii
n
( ( )) 
=

1
= x. (4)
For incentive compatibility, consider agent j’s best reply to e-j*. Notice that the best reply of agent
j lies on the interval [0, ej*], in which case x is a function of ej alone. Consequently,
vj(gj(x(ej, e-j*))) = vj(ej) on the relevant interval, and we have that,
arg max
e j
{vj(gj(x(ej, e-j*)))  + kjQ(x(ej, e-j*)) - vj(ej)} = arg max
e j
kjQ(x(ej, e-j*)) = ej*. (5)
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Formally, gi(x) ≡ f--1(x)/bi.
9Hence e* is incentive compatible under σ*. That σ* satisfies individual rationality follows since
σ* can be rigged to satisfy any participation constraint by a proper adjustment of kj. Limited
liability follows from σ*(x) being non-negative in any equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Since all partners get their highest possible equilibrium payoff in e*, this choice is a Pareto-
dominating equilibrium under σ*. Returning to Example 1, consider σ* with kA = 1/5 and kB =
4/5 [any kB ∈ (¾, 1) works]. Then Betty gets ¾ from doing her own project, and 4/5 in
equilibrium from participating in the partnership. Hence σ* solves the participation problem in
Example 1.
4. The Model under Uncertainty
This part investigates whether implementation is possible when the deterministic model is
perturbed. To focus on incentive issues, agents are assumed to be risk-neutral.8 For brevity, I
sometimes write f(..) instead of f(min [b1e1, ... , bnen]). First consider the case when individual
productivity is deterministic but noise is added to joint output, and then consider the case with
noise added to individual productivity.9 In the first case we have,
x := f(..)ε       (6)
                                                
8 I use multiplicative noise rather than additive noise since an additive formulation creates the awkward possibility of
negative output.
9 The case when noise is added to min(b1e1, …, b2e2) directly is complex. In the case of constant returns to scale, as in
LMV, it will be clear from the same logic as underlying Proposition 2 that the efficient effort vector is
implementable, but the more general case is open; the joint (expected) production function is not differentiable but it
is unclear whether there exists a sharing rule implementing e*.
10
where the stochastic term ε has support ℜ+ with E(ε) = 1, where E is the expectation operator.
Proposition 2.
Given that the deterministic model is perturbed in the sense of (6), the efficient effort vector is
implementable given sufficiently low participation constraints.
Proof.
Since E[f(..)]ε simply equals f(..), the efficient e of the perturbed problem equals the efficient e of
the deterministic problem. Formally,
e* := 
e
arg max E[f(..)ε - v ei ii ( ) ] = 
e
arg max [f(..) - v ei ii ( ) ]            (7)
But, again since E[f(..)ε] = f(..), if ei* is incentive compatible in the deterministic problem it is
also incentive compatible in the perturbed problem; if ei* maximizes βi*f(ei, e-i*) – vi(ei), then ei*
also maximizes E[βi*f(ei, e-i*)ε - vi(ei)]. Q.E.D.
Notice that σ* is not viable in solving the implementation problem of Proposition 2 since noise
makes it impossible to invert the production function, while β* does not rely on invertibility. In
consequence we can solve the implementation problem if participation constraints are sufficiently
low. Let me comment more specifically on what the distribution of participation constraints must
be for implementation to be possible with β*.
11
When agents are symmetric with respect to technologies (i.e., bi = bj, ∀i,j and vi(..) = vj(..) for
∀i,j), symmetric participation levels are sufficient to ensure efficiency with β*. However, when
technologies are asymmetric, symmetric participation constraints are no longer sufficient for
implementation, since asymmetric technologies imply that the partners get a different share of
(net) surplus under β* (see Observation 1). It is of some interest to check the relation between
asymmetries of technology and (asymmetry of) participation constraints to ensure efficiency with
β*. In particular, a desirable property of β* would be that a more productive agent is given a
higher share of surplus under β* than a less productive agent, since it can easily be argued that a
higher productivity inside the partnership is associated with a higher productivity outside the
partnership, and hence a higher outside option.10 To illustrate that β* does not have this property
generally, consider the following example.
Example 2.
Suppose that vi(ei) = 
1
2
2ei , while x = min(b1e1, e2), where b1 > 0. Hence b1 < 1 reflects a situation
where agent 1 is more productive than agent 2, and b1 > 1 reflects a situation where agent 1 is
more productive than agent 2. As can easily be computed, e* = ( 2
1
1
1 b
b
+
, 2
1
2
1
1 b
b
+
), and
consequently β* = (
1
11 *)('
b
ev , *)(' 22 ev ) = ( 2
11
1
b+
, 2
1
2
1
1 b
b
+
). We then get equilibrium utilities
equal to,
                                                
10 Legros & Newman (1996) considers partnerships in a general equilibrium framework.
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EU1(β*,e*) = E(β1*e1* b1ε)- v1(e1*) = 2
11
1
b+ 21
1
1 b
b
+
-
2
1 ( 2
1
1
1 b
b
+
)2 = 2
1 ( 2
1
1
1 b
b
+
)2, while (8)
EU2(β*,e*) = E(β2*e2*ε)- v2(e2*) = 2
1
2
1
1 b
b
+ 21
2
1
1 b
b
+
-
2
1 ( 2
1
2
1
1 b
b
+
)2 = 2
1 ( 2
1
2
1
1 b
b
+
)2.
From (8) it follows that the equilibrium utility of agent 1 from participating in the partnership is
decreasing in b1 (in fact his utility goes to zero as b1 increases). Intuitively, when b1 increases, the
efficient action for agent 2 increases, and for this increase to come about, β2* increases, and
hence β1* must decrease, with a resulting utility loss for agent 1.11
Now consider the case when noise is added to individual productivity. Let joint productivity be
given by f(A), where A := min[A1, …,  An]. Moreover,
Ai := bieiεi.                (9)
The stochastic term εi is iid with support ℜ+. Let Gi(z) denote εi’s distribution function, assumed
to be twice differentiable, and let gi(z) denote the density. Realized surplus, H(e,ε), equals,
H(e,ε) := f(A) - ivi(ei),                    (10)
and the ex-ante efficient vector, e*, equals,
                                                
11 In general, there are two effects on EU1(β*,e*) from increasing b1. β1* decreases, which goes in the direction of
lower utility of agent 1, and x increases (while e1* decreases) which goes in the direction of higher utility for agent 1.
While the first effect dominates the second effect in the constructed example, the general case is open.
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e* := 
e∈Ε
arg max E[H(e,ε)]                (11)
It is natural to assume, by free disposal type of arguments, that optimal sharing rules must be
monotonic when output is stochastic (see e.g., Innes, 1990). I therefore confine attention to
sharing rules that are increasing in each of its elements, i.e., satisfy si(x) ≥ si(x’) for x ≥ x’. Notice
that the sharing rules considered so far have been monotonic. We then have the following result.12
Proposition 3.
Given that the deterministic model is perturbed in the sense of (9), there does not exist a sharing
rule that implements the efficient effort vector.
Proof.
To avoid tedious notation, confine attention to the case n = 2. Let Mi(a;ei) be Ai’s distribution
function conditional on ei. Then,
Mi(a;ei) := Prob(Ai ≤ a|ei) = Prob(bieiεi ≤ a) = Prob(εi ≤ a/biei) = g z dzi
a b ei i
( )
/
0
  = Gi(a/biei)    (12)
                                                
12 Puzzlingly, if disposal were impossible, and hence non-monotonic sharing rules are feasible, it is not
straightforward to derive a negative result.
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Thus for ei > 0, Ai’s density function, mi(a; ei) equals 
g a b e
b e
i i i
i i
( )/
. Let M(a;e) be the distribution
function of A, i.e., the distribution function of min(A1, A2), and m(a;e) the corresponding density.
Then, by independence,
M(a;e) = Prob(A1 ≤ a or A2 ≤ a) = 1 - Prob(A1 > a and A2 > a) =
1 - [1-M1(a;e1)][1-M2(a;e2)] = M1(a;e1) + M2(a;e2) - M1(a;e1)M2(a;e2) (13)
m(a;e) = m1(a;e1)[1 - M2(a;e2)] + m2(a;e2)[1 - M1(a;e1)] =
g a b e
b e
1 1 1
1 1
( )/
[1 - G2(a/b2e2)] + 
g a b e
b e
2 2 2
2 2
( )/
[1 - G1(a/b1e1)]                (14)
Notice that from (13), it can easily be verified that 
ie
eaM
∂
∂ );(  < 0, i.e., effort increase of one of the
agents induces an FOSD distribution of output. Given (14), we get expected utility for i,
E[si(f(a(e)))]  = 
∞
0
);())(( daeamafsi (15)
Importantly, E[si(f(a(e)))] is differentiable with respect to ei since m(a;e) is differentiable with
respect to ei from (14). From (15) and budget-balance, efficiency implies:
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i
i
e
daamafs
∂
∂
∞
)())((
0 +
i
j
e
daeamafs
∂
∂
∞
);())((
0 - vi’(ei) = 0 (16)
However, in a Nash equilibrium, 
i
i
e
daeamafs
∂
∂
∞
);())((
0 - vi’(ei) = 0. Consistency with (16)
requires, 
i
j
e
daeamafs
∂
∂
∞
);())((
0  = 0. But since sj(..) is increasing, and since an increase in ei
induces a FOSD distribution of output, it is trivial to show that 
i
j
e
daeamafs
∂
∂
∞
);())((
0  > 0, unless
sj is identically equal to zero, in which case there is a contradiction for agent j. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, noise imposed on individual productivity smoothens the kink in the production
function, which implies that the free-riding intuition of Holmström (1982) holds true:13 Nash
equilibrium implies that the agents do not take into account the positive externality when
inducing effort, in contrast to their behavior in social optimum.14
                                                
13 To understand why differentiability makes such a difference, consider the necessary conditions for social optimum
in the differentiable and the non-differentiable case. With differentiability, the necessary condition for optimum is x’-
vi’(ei) = 0, while in the non-differentiable case the necessary condition is x’-vi‘(ei)- vj‘(ei) = 0. The point is that in the
second case, it is not necessary to give agent i full incentives to make him perform the efficient action. This leeway,
which makes implementation possible, does not exist in the first case.
14 Notice that the specification of noise in (9) is quite general since it allows for any (differentiable) distribution of the
εi’s. Thus noise at individual level can be made arbitrarily ‘small’ and still implementation is impossible. However,
16
5. Conclusion
This paper has considered the robustness of a positive implementation result for Leontief
partnerships obtained by Legros & Matthews (1993) and Vislie (1994). I first showed that
implementation with their sharing rule is non-robust to the introduction of participation
constraints and limited liability. However, Proposition 1 mitigated this problem by the
construction of σ*, a sharing rule reminiscent of the Groves mechanism, which satisfies both
incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and limited liability.
The positive results of LMV and of the present paper are obtained in a deterministic model. Part 4
considered whether the positive results are robust to perturbing the model. First, noise was added
to joint output. The interpretation of this perturbation is that the partners know each others’
productivity, but are uncertain about how much production that will emerge from their joint
efforts. Proposition 2 showed that, in that case, implementation is still possible. The next
robustness test added noise to individual productivity. Then the joint production function
becomes differentiable, and by a similar argument to Holmström (1982), implementation was
shown to be impossible. Thus free-riding in Leontief partnerships can be mitigated if uncertainty
is added to the aggregate level, while uncertainty added to the individual level makes free-riding
unavoidable.
An interesting interpretation of the second type of perturbation is that the stochastic component in
individual output reflects a partner’s uncertainty about the other partner’s production technology.
                                                                                                                                                             
the continuity of the problem suggests that for sufficiently low level of noise, e* is implementable in an ε-equilibrium.
See Legros & Matthews (1993), Section 5, for a related discussion.
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In that case, which model is more appropriate, the deterministic model or the stochastic model,
depends on whether the partners have learned each other’s production technology. Since a
negative conclusion follows in the case where agents have not learned their technologies, the
findings of the present paper suggest that partnerships are most likely to be formed by individuals
with complementary skills, and moreover that know each other well.
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